

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Summary: On 18 December 2013, [redacted] and [redacted] briefed Senate Armed Services Committee staff members [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC
424

[redacted] regarding the initial assessment report of the Information Review Task Force-2 (IRTF-2). [redacted]

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424

(b)(6)

[redacted] also attended the briefing.

(b)(6)

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(U) Bottom Line: [redacted] requested a briefing regarding IRTF-2 scope, mission, and initial findings. Both he and [redacted] found the discussion very informative.

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424

(U) Due outs: None.

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(1),(b)(3):P.L.
86-36, T.4 (c)

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion: [redacted] discussed the role of the DIA-led IRTF-2, which will triage, analyze and assess DoD impacts related to the Snowden compromise

[redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

Lt. General Flynn & Mr. Shedd,

Yesterday afternoon, 5 February, DIA led an IRTF-2 briefing to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities (HASC-IETC). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] represented DIA. Joint Staff briefers included Brig Gen Jim Marrs, Deputy Director, J2 and [REDACTED] Deputy Director of J6. NCIX [REDACTED] also attended. Subcommittee asked the brief focus on defense related matters and impacts.

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC
130b,(b)(6)

Chairman Thornberry led the briefing. Although the briefing was for the IETC subcommittee, Chairman Thornberry opened the briefing up to the entire HASC committee membership. Eleven other members attended the briefing, including HASC Chairman McKeon.

Bottom Line: HASC Members were most interested in information that could damage Edward Snowden's credibility in the press and in the court of public opinion.

Members from both sides (Reps. Nugent, Scott, Johnson, and Davis) repeatedly pressed the briefers for information from the report to be made releasable to the public. [REDACTED] explained the

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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

restrictions were to [REDACTED] but the members appeared unmoved by this argument.

Reps. Nugent and Gallego were interested in why Snowden had the access that he did and why intelligence information isn't protected by "need to know". Reps. Davis and Peters were also interested in the total cost of the compromise and any ongoing efforts to mitigate the leaks. Rep. Peters noted that the committee this data in advance of marking up the FY15 Defense bill.

Overall, HASC members were appreciative of the report and expressed repeatedly that this information needed to be shared at some level with the American public. Chairman Thornberry also noted that the committee expects a quarterly briefing by both DIA and Joint Staff.

HASC Chairman McKeon and IETC Chairman Thornberry held a press availability following the briefing in which they again stressed their belief that Mr. Snowden is a "traitor" and not a "whistleblower."

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[REDACTED] will provide a more detailed EXSUM. There were no due outs for DIA.

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(U) Summary: On 6 February 2014, [redacted] (former Chief, Information Review Task Force 2) and [redacted] (Chief, Information Review Task Force 2) provided a briefing to Professional Staff

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Members (PSMs) for the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) regarding the Snowden disclosures and the Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) initial report. PSMs in attendance included HAC-D intelligence staffers [redacted]

[redacted] Other HAC-D staff attended who generally focus on acquisitions and O&M for the services.

(b)(6)


(b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ Bottom Line: This briefing was the second briefing to HAC-D staff on materials compromised by NSA leaker Edward Snowden and the assessment of the impact. HAC-D has scheduled a briefing for members on 22 February.

(U) Due outs: IRTF-1 Report and recent Congressional testimony by DIA DR on the IRTF-2.

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion: [redacted] opened the briefing by providing a short overview of the timeline of the disclosures by Edward Snowden.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC
3024(i),1.4
(a),1.4 (c),1.4
(e)



(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC
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(U) Summary: On 6 February, former IRTF-2 Chief [redacted] briefed House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) Professional Staff Members (PSMs) [redacted]

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424

[redacted] on the IRTF-2's report and assessment of DoD information potentially compromised by Edward Snowden. [redacted] successor as IRTF-2 Chief, [redacted] also participated.

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424

(U) Bottom Line: HAC-D PSMs were interested in the IRTF-2 report and noted the interest of subcommittee leadership and Members. They were particularly interested in the road ahead for the Joint Staff Mitigation Oversight Task Force (MOTF) and the costs of the mitigation efforts. Several of the PSMs appeared surprised and concerned at the extent of information that was potentially compromised by Edward Snowden.

(U) Due outs: The PSMs requested that IRTF-2 brief HAC-D Members on 26 February. Staff also requested a copy of IRTF-1 report as well as the DR's recent annual threat assessment testimony.

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Discussion: [redacted] opened the discussion with a brief overview of the IRTF-2's origin, composition, and mission to assess the impact from the compromise of Department of Defense information. Many of the PSMs were interested in Edward Snowden's background, motivations, and tactics. Those questions were deferred to the [redacted] for future briefings. Staff were also

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

interested in the potential impacts of information taken on future military action. [redacted] said that the information taken could negatively impact future military operations, [redacted]

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424

(b)(3):10 USC
424, (b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

[redacted] Staff also asked whether there were any changes to the FY15 budget request as a result of the disclosures. [redacted] said that the IRTF-2 activities and mitigation thus far has been taken out of the current budget, and they will not see any budget adjustments due to the latest disclosures. Any changes in the counterintelligence or insider threat budgets were already programmed.

(b)(3):10 USC
424, (b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC
424

Lt. General Flynn & Mr. Shedd,

(b)(3):10 USC
424

This morning 6 February, DIA provided an IRTF-2 briefing to the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) Professional Staff Members (PSMs). Former IRTF-2 Chief [redacted] led the discussion with IRTF-2 Chief [redacted] also participating.

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424

(b)(6)

PSMs present included HAC-D intelligence staffers [redacted]

(b)(6)

[redacted] Other HAC-D staff attended who generally focus on acquisitions and O&M for the services.

Bottom Line: HAC-D PSMs were interested in the IRTF-2 report and noted the interest of subcommittee leadership and members. They were particularly interested in the road ahead for the Joint Staff Mitigation Oversight Task Force (MOTF) and the costs of the mitigation efforts. Several of the PSMs appeared surprised and concerned at the extent of the Department of Defense information that was potentially compromised by Edward Snowden.

Many of the PSMs were interested in Edward Snowden's background, motivations and tactics, and those questions were deferred to the [redacted] for future briefings. Staff were also interested in the potential impacts of information taken on future military action. [redacted] said that the information taken could negatively impact future military operations, [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

[redacted] Staff also asked whether there were any changes to the FY15 budget request as a result of the disclosures. [redacted] said that the IRTF-2 activities and mitigation thus far has been taken out of the current budget, and they will not see any budget adjustments due to the latest disclosures. Any changes in the counterintelligence or insider threat budgets were already programmed.

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USC 3024(i)


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The PSMs have requested that DIA brief HAC-D members on the IRTF-2 on 26 February. Staff also requested DIA to deliver the IRTF-1 report as well as testimony from the DR from recent hearings.

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[redacted] will provide a formal EXSUM.

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(b)(3):10 USC
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From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 3:14 PM

(b)(3):10 USC
424

To: Shedd David R DIA USA CIV; [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(3):10 USC
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Subject: EXSUM - IRTF-2/MOTF Brief to HASC and SASC Staff

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC
424

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Sir,

The following EXSUM is provided for your information. [REDACTED]

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424

~~(S//NF)~~ Summary: [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(6), 1.4 (c)

Damage Resulting

from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor

(U) Bottom Line: This briefing was a dry run and chance for the IRTF-2/MOTF briefers to discuss the material with staff before briefing HASC Members on 11 September. The staff expressed appreciation for the IRTF-2 assessments, and said that the first report was one of the most well-read documents by Members in recent years and that interest is still very high. However, the staff questioned why, if the second report was completed in June, it hasn't yet been passed to Congress. The staff also warned that Members would be frustrated if the MOTF could not show progress and provide specific examples of steps taken to mitigate damage done to capabilities, plans, and partnerships by the breach. They recommended focusing less on process and more on mitigation efforts and anticipated costs. SASC PSM [REDACTED] commented that he felt the MOTF briefers were trying to lower expectations.

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424

(b)(6)

(U) Due outs: No due outs for DIA, but HASC PSM [redacted] requested a copy of the IRTF-2's second report and urged USD(I) to expedite coordination in order to give Members a chance to read the report before the 11 September briefing. In light of the request, USD(I) is currently seeking stakeholder concurrence with providing the "Executive Summary" of the report.

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion: [redacted]

the discussion and opened by providing an overview [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(6), 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ Summary:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(6),1.4 (c)

Damage Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

~~(S//NF)~~ Bottom Line:

(U) Due outs: No due outs.

(U) Attendance: Chairman Thornberry (R-TX) and Ranking Member Langevin (D-RI) received the initial briefing, but Rep. Hartzler (R-MO) and Rep. Lamborn (R-CO) arrived as the briefing concluded and [redacted] met with them separately.

(b)(3):10 USC
130b,(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC
424

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion: Chairman Thornberry opened up by indicating that despite his tardiness, this was a briefing he did not want to miss as it has been a long time since he received an update on what information was compromised and the impact to U.S. national security. He also mentioned that it was hard to think of something that has happened in the world that is more deserving of a response and that can affect future funding. Furthermore, he highlighted he was aware there was a new IRTF-2 report completed but has not been provided to Congress and questioned [redacted] about the [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424

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424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Summary: On 15 September 2014, [redacted] (Chief, IRTF-2) and [redacted] (SIA, IRTF-2) participated in a joint briefing to [redacted] (HAC-D) and [redacted] (SAC-D) on the second IRTF-2 report. [redacted] provided subsequent steps taken by the Joint Staff-led Mitigation Oversight Task Force (MOTF). [redacted] (USDI) was also present.

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424

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130b,(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(U) Bottom Line: HAC-D and SAC-D staffers have been following the reports about the information compromised by the former NSA contractor very closely. [redacted] indicated this engagement was timely because Rep. Frelinghuysen (Chairman) and Rep. Visclosky (Ranking Member) are interested in hearing about the updated damage assessments. She plans on updating HAC-D Members before the leave town on the campaign recess. [redacted] did reinforce she was interested in receiving the 2nd quarter IRTF-2 report as soon as possible.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(U) Due outs: None.

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Summary:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC
424,(b)(6),1.4
(c)

~~(S//NF)~~ Bottom Line:

(U) Due outs: HPSCI staffers requested an update of the unclassified talking points that was provided to them in February based on the findings from the 2nd Quarter IRTF-2 report. [] is working with the [] (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC
424,(b)(5),1.4
(c)

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(U) Summary: On 23 September 2014, [redacted] (Chief, IRTF-2) and [redacted] (SIO, IRTF-2) participated in a joint briefing to SSCI staff members. [redacted] provided

(b)(3):10 USC
424

subsequent steps taken by the Joint Staff-led Mitigation Oversight Task Force (MQTF). [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[redacted] (USDI) was also present. SSCI staffers in attendance included [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(U) Bottom Line: SSCI staffers have been following the reports about the information compromised by the former NSA contractor. [redacted] requested an update for the entire SSCI staff. He also indicated that they would like the 2nd quarter IRTF-2 report as soon as possible. [redacted] stated that the Congress should have the report within 30 days.

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130b,(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

(U) Due outs: None.

~~(S//NF)~~ Discussion: [redacted] provided details of task force activities and highlighted on-going damage assessments.

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USC 130b,(b)
(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(3):P.L. 86-
36,(b)(6),1.4 (c)

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424

(U) Prepared by: [redacted]

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424,(b)(6)

From:
To:

Cc:
Subject:
Date:

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3024(i)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET/ ☐ NOFORN

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The following ExSum is provided for your information. V/R, ☐

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(U) Summary: On 4 December 2013, ☐

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424

☐ provided a briefing to ☐ for the House
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) staff, regarding the Snowden
disclosures and the Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2). Other briefers were from the Office of
the National Counter Intelligence Executive (NCIX).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

~~(S/NF)~~ Bottom Line: ☐

(U) Due outs: IRTF-2 Initial Report

~~(S/NF)~~ Discussion: ☐

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36,
(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i),1.4
(c),1.4 (e),1.4
(f),1.4 (g)

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424

(U) Prepared by: ☐

DoD Unclassified Talking Points Related to the Compromise of Classified Information by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor

1. A former NSA contractor downloaded nearly 1.7 million files from Intelligence Community (IC) systems. This is the single greatest quantitative potential compromise of secrets in U.S. history.
2. Much of the information compromised has the potential to gravely impact the National Security of the United States, to include the Department of Defense and its capabilities.
3. While most of the reporting to date in the press has centered on NSA's acquisition of foreign intelligence to protect the lives of our citizens and allies, the files cover sensitive topics well beyond the NSA collection. Disclosure of this information in the press and to adversaries has the potential to put Defense personnel in harm's way and jeopardize the success of DoD operations.
4. These unauthorized disclosures have tipped off our adversaries to intelligence sources and methods and negatively impacted our Allies who partner with us to fight terrorism, cyber crime, human and narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such international cooperation involving the pooling of information, technology, and expertise is critical to preserve our security and that of our allies.
5. An Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) of the Department of Defense, led by the Defense Intelligence Agency and working in coordination with elements of the Intelligence Community, is conducting an assessment of the impact to the Department of Defense from the compromise of this information.

Sent to Hill 1/8

(b)(6) RTQ - IRTE Redactions Rationale [redacted] 5/30/2014

(b)(6) Q. [redacted] asks: "Please get me a response by Friday morning as to why DIA released so little of the assessment... Two lines of conclusions... Editors want a blog posting to include a DIA comment. Can you get by noon?"

A. "The redactions were made in accordance with the FOIA exemptions noted on the released document. Because this matter is still the subject of litigation in US District Court and a criminal investigation, we decline to comment further."

ODNI Suggested adding: (included above)

"Because this matter is still the subject of a criminal investigation, we decline to comment further."

Lt. General Flynn & Mr. Shedd,

(b)(3):10 USC 424 This evening IRTF-2 Chief [redacted] and IRTF-2 Senior Analyst [redacted] briefed members of the HPSCI on the IRTF-2 interim report. NCIX [redacted] also attended and spoke briefly during Q&A. (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(6)

Chairman Rogers lead the brief with Rep. Langevin as acting Ranking Member (Ranking Member Ruppersberger [redacted])

(b)(6)

(b)(6) [redacted] Nine other members attended including Rep. Thornberry, Rep. Conoway and HAC-D Chairman Frelinghuysen.

Bottom Line: HPSCI Members are very appreciative of the "excellent and timely" report by the IRTF-2 and spoke highly of the efforts of the Task Force. Chairman Rogers noted that there were other IC elements conducting reviews and that he looked forward to hearing from them on their initial assessments in the near future. [redacted] made an opening statement but most of the time was spent on Q&A with topics including the cost of mitigation, the risk to soldiers on the ground, defense vulnerabilities as a result of the compromise, and the scope of data secured by the Person of Interest (POI). There was particular interest in why the POI – who claims publicly to be seeking to reform NSA – acquired so many DOD files unrelated to NSA activities. [redacted] both explained that he appeared to have acquired all files he could reach and that [redacted] could better address his collection methods and/or strategies. Chairman Rogers and Rep. Schiff raised the issue that most documents were DOD related – which [redacted] confirmed – and both the congressmen stated they believed this simple fact was both unclassified (based on other discussions, not IRTF-2) and was important for changing the narrative of the POI. Chairman Rogers and Mr. Montoya discussed assessments of the POI's motives and activities which are outside of DIA's lane in the road.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

As a final note, Chairman Rogers stated that this would be a topic of the ATA hearing and noted that General Flynn might be speaking much more than he would normally do at these hearings. I assess he is likely to ask you next Monday in closed session what he can discuss in the subsequent unclassified session.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[redacted] will provide a formal ExSum.

TOP SECRET// [REDACTED] NOFORN

(U) INFORMATION REVIEW TASK FORCE-2 (IRTF-2)

(U) PURPOSE

(U//FOUO) Provide an opening statement for Former IRTF-2 Chief [REDACTED] as he briefs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on task force activities and initial assessment.

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424

(U) Introduction

- (U) Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, committee members, thank you for this opportunity to talk about Department of Defense efforts to assess the impact of the single largest compromise of secrets in U.S. history.

(U) Background

- (U) As you all no doubt know, on 07 June 2013 the media began publishing classified information related to NSA operations. On 09 June 2013, we learned that a former NSA contractor was the source of this information when he was publically identified by the press. Since our assessment is separate from the criminal investigation, we identify him as the Person of Interest or POI.
- (U) On 10 July 2013, DIA was informed that Department of Defense information was included in the files taken by the POI. In response, DIA Director LTG Michael Flynn directed the standup of a DoD Task Force to tackle the compromise. Rather than start from scratch, key members of the task force that assessed the WikiLeaks compromise in 2010 were again brought together to form the nucleus of the "Information Review Task Force-2." Led by DIA, and working in coordination with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and our Intelligence Community partners, the IRTF-2 includes representation from the military services, the combatant commands and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (U) On a given day, DoD has 200-250 people dedicated to the assessment. The chart on page 7 of our initial assessment report provides a breakdown of the numbers of IRTF-2 participants in each DoD Component. The chart on page 8 of our report provides a breakdown of the compromised data sets and the locations from where they were copied. Notably, as far as volume, over 900,000 files were taken from [REDACTED] Most of the DoD files

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424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

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424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)
(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):P.L.
86-36,(b)(3):50

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424,(b)(3):P.L.
86-36,(b)(3):50

TOP SECRET// [REDACTED] NOFORN

THE LAST 2 PAGES
ARE WITHHELD IN
FULL IAW
EXEMPTIONS B1
AND B3 AND ARE
NOT INCLUDED.

(U) Information Review Task Force-2

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(3):P.L. 86-
36,1.4 (c)

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3024(i)

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424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Still, we knew our priority was to quickly scope the problem for DoD. By mid-November, we had enough understanding of the problem to produce an initial assessment. We briefed our initial findings to Gen Martin Dempsey and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at [REDACTED] Our IRTF-2 Initial Assessment was published on 18 Dec 2013 and copies were provided to our six oversight committees on 6 January 2014.

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USC 424,(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36,(b)

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



DEC 26 2013

~~TS~~ 13-2381/CE

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman McKeon and Ranking Member Smith,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor. [REDACTED]

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Following notification from NSA in July 2013 of the DoD-wide scope of compromised data, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) established the IRTF-2 to acquire, triage, analyze, and assess all DIA and DoD compromised information. The IRTF-2 is managed by DIA with close participation and input from the combatant commands (CCMDs) and Military Services. Many CCMDs and services have produced separate reports that focus in greater detail on the potential impact of the compromise. These are appended to this report. It should be noted Signals Intelligence equities are not addressed in this report. NSA is reviewing those separately.

(U) Some initial findings are:


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USC 424,(b)
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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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USC 424,(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36,
(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i), 1.4 (c)



(U) If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in a briefing on DoD IRTF's Initial Assessment, please contact Congressional Operations Team Chief,

(b)(3):10 USC
424


(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)




Very respectfully,

Enclosure:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 302




MICHAEL A. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

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~~NOFORN~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



~~TS~~ 13-2381/CE

DEC 26 2013

The Honorable Rodney Frehlinghuysen
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Pete Visclosky
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Frelinghuysen and Ranking Member Visclosky,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor.

(b)(1), 1-4 (e)

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(U) Some initial findings are:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 302


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(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36,(b)



(U) If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in a briefing on DoD IRTF's Initial Assessment, please contact Congressional Operations Team Chief, [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC
424


Very respectfully,

(b)(3):10 USC
424

Enclosure:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC
3024(i), 1.4 (c)




MICHAEL T. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20346-5100



~~TS~~-13-2381/CE

DEC 26 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable James Inhofe
Ranking Member
Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Levin and Ranking Member Inhofe,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor. [REDACTED]

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
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3024(i),1.4 (c)




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Very respectfully,


MICHAEL T. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

Enclosure:

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



TS-13-2381/CE

DEC 26 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor.

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
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
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



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MICHAEL T. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

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NOFORN



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



TS 13-2381/CE

DEC 26 2013

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor.

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
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


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3024(i)

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MICHAEL T. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



TS-13-2381/CE

DEC 26 2013

The Honorable Richard Durbin
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Durbin and Ranking Member Cochran,

~~(S//NF)~~ We provide for your information the Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) *Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency Contractor*. This report presents IRTF-2's initial assessment of impact to DoD from the compromise of classified files by a former NSA contractor.

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
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MICHAEL T. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
Director

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LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

2 / 27D 2014

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
Chairwoman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510


Dear Madam Chairwoman:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424, 1-4 (c)

(S//NF) [redacted] damage assessments by the Department of
Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2), *Damage Resulting from the
Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency (NSA) Contractor.*

(U) We will ensure that future iterations of the quarterly IRTF-2 and MOTF reports are
delivered to the appropriate congressional committees in a timely manner.

Sincerely,


Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Vice Chairman

~~TOP SECRET~~

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LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510


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Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
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The Honorable James M. Inhofe
Ranking Member

TOP SECRET

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

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AFFAIRS

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
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Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510


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Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

5 SEP 1994

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510


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Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Ranking Member

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

5 SEP 2014


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Sincerely,


Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member

TOP SECRET

NOFORN



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515


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Elizabeth L. King

Enclosure:
As stated

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The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
Ranking Member